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Transnational Soldiers and Guerrilla Warfare from the 
Spanish Civil War to the Second World War 
Jorge Marco (University of Bath) 
 “Because of Spain, we knew ten times more than any of the other guys”1 
 
War underwent a profound political, technological and social transformation in 
the 19th and 20th centuries. One of the key elements in this transformation was 
the relationship between war and society. On the one hand, in “total war”, 
civilians became a strategic military target, which would explain the high number 
of civilian victims in the armed conflicts of the first half of the 20th century.2 On 
the other hand, there had been mass mobilization of civilians by national armies 
since the end of the 18th century. This gave rise to two, apparently contradictory, 
phenomena: the massive conscription of civilians and the rise of the volunteer 
soldier.3 As states sought to strengthen patriotic feelings and border control, the 
phenomenon of transnational soldiers began to appear. These were men and 
women who fought, either voluntarily or under duress, for other countries but 
with different motives to those of mercenaries.4  
                                                          
1 Interview with Irving Goff in Studs Terkel, “The Good War”: An Oral History of World War Two (New 
York: Pantheon Book, 1984), p. 492 
2 Peter H. Wilson, ‘European Warfare, 1815-2000’ in War in the Modern World since 1815, ed. Jeremy 
Black (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 209-211.  
3 Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen, ‘Introduction: Volunteers, War, and the Nation since the French 
Revolution’ in War Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War, 
eds. Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-22 
4 Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, ‘Introduction: Transnational Military Service since the Eighteenth Century’, 
in Transnational Soldiers Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era, eds. Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1-12 
 This new civil element of war was particularly apparent in the ‘the wars of 
liberation’ in Spain, Russia and Prussia during the Napoleonic wars. Emulating 
the myth of David against Goliath, ordinary citizens organised national resistance 
efforts against the ‘foreign army’ through small irregular armed groups. Although 
guerrilla warfare was not new, its novel political and psychological aspects 
certainly were. The idea of people taking up arms and forming irregular groups to 
combat powerful national or foreign armies spread throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries to become one of the major novelties of modern warfare.5  
 Guerrilla warfare is a strategy for irregular groups with limited resources, 
who use it to try to overcome the advantages of their powerful enemy. However, 
it can also be a military strategy in which the activity of irregular groups is 
combined with the conventional operations of a regular army. The Spanish Civil 
War and the Second World War (WWII) are two clear examples of a combined 
strategy of regular and irregular warfare, while most wars since the Cold War 
have exploited the potential of asymmetric warfare.6   
The great innovation of the Spanish Civil War was the formation of elite 
groups specializing in sabotage and intelligence, under centralized military 
command. The potential of this strategy was developed later during WWII with a 
proliferation of these units in Great Britain (the British Commandos), the United 
States (Special Operations groups) and Germany (Brandenburgers). The two 
main Allied intelligence agencies, the British SOE and the American OSS, made 
                                                          
5 Camille Rougeron, ‘La dimension Historique de la Guérilla’, in Les guerre irrégulières: XX ͤ-XXI  ͤsiècle 
ed. Gérard Chaliand (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2008), pp. 65-82. 
6 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their opponents since 
1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. vii. 
great efforts to promote this type of unit.7 However, in 1939 the military 
experience and knowledge of guerrilla warfare was still quite limited.  
The aim of the present article is to show how military institutions 
incorporated innovations in their tactics using the intermediary role of 
transnational soldiers in the Spanish War. Soviet advisers and instructors trained 
hundreds of Spanish and foreign volunteers on guerrilla warfare, transferring 
their knowledge from the Russian Civil War to the Spanish Civil War. After the 
war in Spain, thousands of Republicans fled the country, taking refuge in France, 
North Africa, the Soviet Union, Latin America, Britain and the USA. This enabled 
their networks, experiences and knowledge to be used by the allies to carry out 
guerrilla warfare in WWII. In order to provide detailed evidence of their 
importance this study consists of an analysis of networks, recruitment and 
training in Spain, USA and North Africa between 1936 and 1945. The accounts of 
some transnational soldiers, together with archive material from Russia, Spain, 
the UK and the USA have made it possible to complete this wide-ranging 
geographical itinerary of the transfer of guerrilla warfare during this period.  
 
“I learned everything in Spain”: Transnational Soldiers in the Spanish Civil 
War (1936-1939) 
                                                          
7 David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: A survey of the Special Operations 
Executive, with Documents (London: MacMillan Press, 1980); Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS: 
Office of Strategic Services, 2 vols. (New York: Walker and Company, 1976); James Lucas, Kommando: 
German Special Operations of World War Two (London: Frontline Books, 2014) 
 “With guerrillas like Tschapaieff (…) the Bolsheviks won their civil war, the 
Chinese defend themselves with guerrillas and we must win this war with 
guerrillas”.8 Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Bayo, later a guerrilla warfare instructor 
for Fidel Castro and “Che” Guevara, expressed himself with such conviction in a 
pamphlet entitled “It will be a guerrilla war”. Bayo aimed to convince the 
Republican Army’s general staff in October 1937 that they should double their 
efforts with regard to guerrilla warfare. “For 16 months of fighting we have 
worked hard with only a very small number of guerrillas as we have not 
acknowledged the importance of this policy or method of waging war”.9 
 Bayo’s report was accurate. Since the start of the war the Republicans had 
implemented guerrilla operations but not in a systematic or organized manner. 
This was mainly due to the crisis facing the Republican Army. The Spanish Civil 
War had started with a military coup, which led to a territorial and internal 
fracturing of the Spanish Army. Only a small number of officers stayed loyal to 
the government of the Second Republic. At the same time, workers’ organizations 
created their own paramilitary groups (armed militias) which competed with the 
remains of the Republican Army for the control of violence practices. During the 
first months of the war the Republican government faced an enormous challenge: 
to create a “popular army” to integrate both loyal officers and the autonomous 
armed militias.10  
                                                          
8 Alberto Bayo, La guerra será de los guerrilleros (Barcelona: Imp. Myria, 1937), cited in: Francisco 
Cabrera and Domingo Blasco, El frente invisible. Guerrilleros republicanos, 1936-1939. De los ‘Niños de 
la Noche’ al XIV Cuerpo (Madrid: Silente, 2013), p. 140. 
9 Bayo, La guerra, p. 140. 
10 Michael Alpert, The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 17-84. 
 This context explains the different facets of guerrilla warfare in the 
Republican Army during the Spanish Civil War. Between July and December 1936 
there were two forms of guerrilla warfare. On the one hand, in territory occupied 
by the Nationalist army, groups of fugitives were organized to carry out acts of 
sabotage, although most were more concerned with mere survival. On the other 
hand, small militia units were formed to cross enemy lines and obtain 
information and carry out sabotage. Some of these groups were organized from 
below with full autonomy from the general staff although there were also some 
unofficial initiatives organized by the Republican Army.11 Notable amongst these 
were the activities of the Soviet official Hajji-Umar Mamsurov,12 who, from 
August 1936, advised and directed several guerrilla units in central and southern 
Spain.13 
 The Spanish Civil War was a laboratory for the Soviet Union to test new 
weapons and combat techniques.14 Consequently, Soviet officials had a vital role 
in implementing guerrilla warfare in the Republican Army. In October 1936 the 
military attaché Vladimir Gorev and other Soviet advisors produced a report with 
the recommendation that a new Republican Army, based on the Red Army, 
should be created, suggesting the need to form guerrilla units for espionage and 
sabotage.15 In December 1936, as a result of Soviet advice, Vicente Rojo, Chief of 
                                                          
11 Cabrera and Blasco, El frente, pp. 37-80. 
12 Mamsurov was a member of the Red Army from 1918, and later worked in the Soviet intelligence 
services. He became deputy chief of intelligence in the Soviet Central Partisan Staff during the Second 
World War. See: Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent; The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p. 572 
13 Yuri Rybalkin, Stalin y España: La ayuda militar soviética a la República (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2007), 
pp. 113-114. 
14 Rybalkin, Stalin, pp. 147-171. 
15 Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), p. 164. 
Staff for the defence of Madrid, officially ordered the creation of the first guerrilla 
units,16 while, in January 1937, the president of the government, Francisco Largo 
Caballero, approved a plan to create guerrilla units within the Republican Army 
throughout the territory.17 The process of militarization of the guerrilla units 
continued until February 1938 when the new elite corps (initially named Special 
Service Groups and later, Guerrilla Battalions), trained in guerrilla schools, were 
formed.18 
 The final stage, between February 1938 and March 1939, was the 
consolidation of guerrilla groups with the creation of the 14th Corps. This new 
elite unit, directed by Domingo Ungría, later to become a Red Army guerrilla in 
the Soviet Union during WWII, was integrated into the Republican Army.19 
Consisting of six divisions, its three main objectives were to: 1) obtain 
information on the enemy (intelligence), 2) destroy transport and 
communication infrastructure, military installations, etc. (sabotage) and 3) cause 
a popular uprising in the enemy rearguard (through propaganda and 
subversion).20 However, it did not reach its peak of organization, training and 
experience until the Republican Army was practically defeated.  
 The slow pace of implementation of guerrilla warfare in the Republican 
Army was due to four key factors: 1) the complexity of creating a new popular 
army incorporating both professional soldiers and members of the militias; 2) the 
                                                          
16 Alpert, Republican Army, p. 71. 
17 Hernan Rodríguez Velasco, ‘Las guerrillas en el Ejército Popular de la República, 1936-1939’, 
Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 33 (2011), p. 241. 
18 Cabrera and Blasco, Frente invisible, pp. 81-145. 
19 Ungría to Dolores, 30 March 1942. Madrid, Archivo del Comité Central del PCE (ACCPCE) Emigración 
URSS, Caja 100/2  
20 Alpert, Republican Army, pp. 265-266; Cabrera and Blasco, Frente invisible, pp. 174-177. 
opposition of some Spanish military officers to the creation of guerrilla units;21 3) 
the poor tactical level of the obsolete Spanish Army;22 and 4) the lack of relevant 
military experience of the majority of the Republican soldiers and officers.23  
 As a result, although some of the international volunteers lacked military 
experience, they made a notable contribution to the Republican Army. The 
Comintern’s guidelines emphasized the importance of recruiting people with 
military experience. However, this requisite varied according to country and 
date.24 This lack of consistency in recruitment resulted in a heterogeneous 
selection of international volunteers. For instance, most of the Polish volunteers 
lacked any military knowledge and only 34% of the Americans had had any kind 
of formal military experience.25 In contrast, others had fought in the First World 
War, the Russian Civil War or in colonial wars, particularly the volunteers from 
Germany and Bulgaria.26   
 However, the Soviet contribution was the largest. It is believed that the 
Soviet Union sent around 4000 people to work in the Republican Army, of whom 
                                                          
21 Vital Gayman, ‘La Base des Brigades Internationales’, Moscow, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political 
History (RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 2. D. 32 
22 Rybalkin, Stalin, p. 83 
23 Alpert, Republican Army, pp. 2, 23. 
24 Daniel Kowalsky, ‘The Soviet Union and the International Brigades, 1936-1939’, Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies, 19-4 (2006), p. 688; Nir Arielli, ‘Getting There: Enlistment Considerations and the 
Recruitment Networks of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War’, in Transnational 
Soldiers Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era, eds. Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 224-225. 
25 Jan Stanisław Ciechanowski, ‘La participación de ciudadanos polacos y de origen polaco en las Brigadas 
Internacionales’, in Al lado del gobierno republicano. Los brigadista de Europa del Este en la guerra civil 
española, eds. Manuel Requena Gallego and Matilde Eiroa (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de 
Castilla-La Mancha, 2009), p. 101; Peter N. Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade 
(Standford: Standford University Press, 1994), p. 65. 
26 VVAA, La solidaridad de los pueblos con la República Española (Moscú: Editorial Progreso, 1974), pp. 
65, 87, 102, 125, 154, 172, 193, 224-226; Ilya G. Dragomir Draganov, ‘Los búlgaros en las Brigadas 
Internacionales’ in Al lado del gobierno republicano. Los brigadista de Europa del Este en la guerra civil 
española, eds. Manuel Requena Gallego and Matilde Eiroa (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de 
Castilla-La Mancha, 2009), p. 167, 173-180. 
6oo were military advisors and instructors.27 It is not known how many were 
directly involved in the development of guerrilla warfare in Spain but the profiles 
of some of these advisors show the great interest of the Soviets in this field. 
Although the extent to which General Alexander Orlov was involved in the 
promotion of guerrilla warfare in Spain is controversial, he undoubtedly put his 
long experience at the disposal of the Republican Army.28 A more important part 
was played by advisors and instructors such as Naum Eitingon, Hajji-Umar 
Mamsurov, Kristofors Intovich Salniņš, Grigory Semyonov, Ilyá Starinov, Grigory 
Syroyezhkin, Guy Lazarevich Tumanian and Stanislav Vaupshasov, among others. 
In addition to their Soviet military academy training, they had experience of 
guerrilla warfare in the Russian Civil War, the Polish-Soviet War and the Chinese 
Civil War.29 Eitingon, Orlov’s deputy in Spain, was, according to his superior, “the 
man most responsible for developing the strategy for commando raids in modern 
times, and (…) the Spanish Civil War was the testing ground for the tactic long 
before the Second World War”.30 
 The film Chapaev, based on the exploits of Soviet partisans in the Russian 
Civil War, was viewed with great enthusiasm by the Spanish and international 
soldiers who served in Spain. The US International Brigader Mito Kruth wrote to 
his wife after seeing the film in Spain: “We too will be little Chapayevs in our 
small way”.31 These new “Chapayevs” were trained in special schools, the most 
                                                          
27 Rybalkin, Stalin, pp. 114, 87-88; Kowalsky, ‘The Soviet Union, p. 689. 
28 Edward Gazur, Alexander Orlov: The FBI’s KGB General (New York: Carrol & Graf Publishers, 2002), 
pp. 48, 55-78; Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, pp. 9, 171-172, 218, 324-325 
29 Cabrera and Blasco, Frente invisible, pp.103-105, 112-116; Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, pp. 169-170, 
187-188, 206. 
30 Gazur, Alexander Orlov, p. 60. 
31 Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, International Communism and the Spanish Civil War: Solidarity and Suspicion 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 122-127. 
important sources for the transmission of guerrilla warfare. Orlov spoke of six 
schools in Spain, of which five have been identified: Benimámet (Valencia), 
Ciudad Lineal (Madrid), Extremadura, Jaén and Sant Cugat del Valles 
(Barcelona), all inaugurated between November 1936 and September 1937.32 The 
most important was Benimámet, which imparted courses on explosives, 
weaponry, topography, military tactics and general history of guerrilla warfare to 
groups of between 20 and 25 students. On graduating, students joined guerrilla 
units where they received further training in reconnaissance, life behind enemy 
lines, ambushes and sabotage.33  
 Adelino Pérez, a guerrilla fighter in the 14th Corps in Spain and later a 
member of the French Resistance, studied at Benimámet. He remembers that 
among the instructors there were many Soviet military officials teaching guerrilla 
theory and tactics. “Benimámet is where I learned, and I learned so much (…) that 
I was later able to give classes on explosives and guerrilla warfare to those 
returning from the trenches. I taught in [the guerrilla school in] Madrid (…) and 
later in France”.34 One of the Soviet instructors in Benimámet was Major 
Starinov, who was also the leader of the partisan movement in the Soviet Union 
during WWII. He stated in his memoirs: “I tried to transmit to the Spaniards the 
experience of partisan warfare which had been accumulated in our nation during 
the civil war”.35  
                                                          
32 Gazur, Alexander Orlov, p. 60; Cabrera and Blasco, Frente invisible, pp. 181-184, 189-191. 
33 Ilyá Starinov, Over the Abyss: My life in Soviet Special Operations (New York: Ivy Books, 1995), p. 77; 
Anna K. Starinov, Behind Fascist Lines: A Firsthand Account of Guerrilla Warfare During the Spanish 
Revolution (New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 2001), p. 25; Rodríguez, ‘Las guerrillas, pp. 245-246. 
34 Interview with Adelino Pérez Salva, in: José Antonio Vidal Castaño, La memoria reprimida. Historias 
orales del maquis (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de Valencia, 2004), pp. 178-180. 
35 Starinov, Over the Abyss, pp. 77-78, 140. 
Thousands of future guerrilla fighters who fought in Spain and in other 
countries during WWII passed through these schools. The total number of 
guerrilleros that fought in the Spanish Civil War is unknown. Orlov declared that 
around 14,ooo Republican soldiers were deployed behind enemy lines,36 although 
this figure appears rather high. What is known is that 3,480 guerrilla fighters 
belonged to the 14th Corps from February 1938 to March 1939.37 Most were 
Spanish although some members of the International Brigades were also 
admitted. It is estimated that there were “hundreds” of transnational soldiers 
integrated into guerrilla units from 15 countries: Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, United States, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Soviet Union, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.38  
William Aalto, a 21-year-old working class Finnish-American, Irving Goff, a 
26-year-old professional actor and acrobat and Alexandre Künstlich, a Jewish-
American university student who abandoned his studies to become a trade 
unionist, were the only three Americans to form part of the guerrilla units. All 
were young New Yorkers and members of the Communist Party of the United 
States (CPUSA) since 1935. Although their personal files in the Comintern 
archives are not very detailed, they contain sufficient information for their paths 
to be followed throughout the war.39 
                                                          
36 Gazur, Alexander Orlov, p. 60. 
37 Alpert, Republican Army, pp. 265-266. 
38 Starinov, Over the Abyss, pp. 97, 141; Cabrera and Blasco, Frente invisible, pp. 106-117; VVAA, La 
solidaridad, pp. 78, 127, 161-163, 315-316, 366. 
39 Carrol, Odyssey, p. 167; Bill Aalto (personal file) From 1 Feb. 1938 to 12 Dec. 1938, RGASPI. F. 545, 
Op. 6. D. 855; Irving Goff (personal file) From 4 sep. 1937 to 5 Jan. 1939, RGASPI. F. 545, Op. 6. D. 898; 
Alexandre Künstlich (personal file) From 1 Feb. 1938 to 9 July 1938, RGASPI. F. 545, Op. 6. D. 927. 
Aalto and Künstlich arrived in Spain in February 1937 with Goff arriving a 
month later, just at the moment that the guerrilla schools were opening. Goff 
reported to the headquarters of the International Brigades in Albacete, where he 
became responsible for the transport of an Anglo-American group of volunteers. 
In October 1937 he joined the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and must have 
arrived at one of the guerrilla schools at this time, probably Benimámet, due to 
its proximity to Albacete. On finishing his training in December 1937 he joined 
the guerrilla units of the Republican Party, reaching the rank of lieutenant. He 
spent six months as a guerrilla fighter on the Teruel, Levante, Córdoba and Motril 
fronts until May 1938.40 
However, Aalto and Künstlich had rather more notable careers. The 
former was probably sent to Benimámet shortly after arriving in Spain. Although 
Künstlich’s itinerary is not clear, it is reasonable to suppose that it was similar to 
that of Aalto. Both attained the rank of captain in the 14th Corps and became the 
leaders of several guerrilla units.  Aalto stood out from the rest of his 
companions, as reported by International Brigades officials: “Comrade Aalto is 
the most outstanding American in this zone, both militarily and politically. He is 
undoubtedly one of the most outstanding comrades of all the Americans who 
have fought in Spain”.41 Such were his qualities that he became a guerrilla 
instructor at the Benimámet and San Cugat del Valles schools.42 
                                                          
40 Bill Aalto. From 1 Feb. 1938 to 12 Dec. 1938, RGASPI; Irving Goff. From 4 Sep. 1937 to 5 Jan. 1939, 
RGASPI; Alexandre Künstlich. From 1 Feb. 1938 to 9 July 1938, RGASPI. 
41 Bill Aalto. From 1 Feb. 1938 to 12 Dec. 1938, RGASPI. 
42 Bill Aalto. From 1 Feb. 1938 to 12 Dec. 1938, RGASPI. 
Aalto became legendary in Spain. For more than a year he organized 
groups of guerrillas in Teruel, Córdoba, Jaén and Granada. His main role was to 
carry out espionage and sabotage behind enemy lines, which he crossed on more 
than a hundred occasions.  However, Aalto, together with Künstlich and Goff, are 
principally remembered for the attack on the fortress at Carchuna (Granada), the 
largest rescue operation of the Spanish Civil War. In May 1938 several guerrilla 
units composed of Spanish and international volunteer soldiers organized an 
attack in Francoist territory to free 300 Republican prisoners. As the fortress-
prison was next to the sea they used motor launches to approach at night. The 
operation was a success: the 300 prisoners were freed and some Francoist soldiers 
captured. However, some guerrilla fighters, including Aalto, Künstlich and Goff 
were trapped in enemy territory. Three days after being posted as missing, news 
reached the base that Aalto and Goff had managed to escape by swimming for 
hours to reach the Republican zone. However, Künstlich was captured by the 
enemy and shot.43 
Thousands of members of the International Brigades returned home or 
went to other countries with a wealth of military experience at the end of the 
Spanish Civil War. Many, including Aalto and Goff, made their experience 
available to their national armies or to resistance movements during WWII. 
“What do I know of guerrilla warfare? I learned everything in Spain.” – Goff 
would declare years later.44 Military organisations such as the American OSS saw 
                                                          
43 Bill Aalto. From 1 Feb. 1938 to 12 Dec. 1938, RGASPI; Irving Goff. From 4 sep. 1937 to 5 Jan. 1939, 
RGASPI; Alexandre Künstlich. From 1 Feb. 1938 to 9 July 1938, RGASPI; Milton Felsen, Anti-Warrior: 
A Memoir (Iowa: Univeristy of Iowa Press, 1989), p. 87; Cabrera and Blasco, Frente invisible, p. 262-267; 
Carrol, Odyssey, pp. 167-168. 
44 Interview with Irving Goff in Terkel, Oral History, p. 491 
in those experienced men an opportunity to enhance their knowledge of guerrilla 
warfare in the context of World War Two.  
 
‘I want all your ideas”: Transnational Soldiers in the US (1941-1942) 
 The neutrality of the United States in WWII between September 1939 and 
December 1941 slowed its development of intelligence and guerrilla warfare units. 
The British secret services, sure that the United States’ involvement in the war 
was inevitable, pressured their North American colleagues to start developing 
these types of activity. Following the German occupation of Denmark, Norway, 
the Netherlands and France in the spring of 1940, the Canadian spy William 
Stephenson –the inspiration for James Bond- organized a trip to Britain for 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s informal emissary: the lawyer and First World 
War hero William J. Donovan. A year later, following the German invasion of 
Yugoslavia and Greece, Donovan and Stephenson again travelled to Europe. On 
his return, Donovan was fully convinced of the need for a centralized intelligence 
agency in the United States and pressed Roosevelt to create it.45  
On July 11th 1941 the president created the office of the Coordination of 
Information (COI) under Donovan’s direction. On June 13th 1942 this was 
renamed Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a similar agency to the British Special 
Operations Executive (SOE), created in July 1940. Between July and December 
1941 Donovan’s COI worked very prudently, mainly offering help to the British 
                                                          
45 David Stafford, Camp X: Canada’s School for Secret Agents, 1941-1945 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen 
Dennys, 1986), p. 27. 
intelligence services. It was in this context that Donovan first met Milton Wolff, a 
commander in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. The 
exact date of this first meeting is still bitterly debated. Wolff, a member of the 
CPUSA, maintained that it was “in the spring of 1941, several months before the 
invasion of the Soviet Union”,46 when the German-Soviet Pact was still in force. 
On the other hand, other authors claim that the meeting must have taken place 
after June 22nd 1941, since the CPUSA and the Comintern would not have 
permitted meetings with the US intelligence services before this date. According 
to these authors the meeting must have taken place in November 1941.47   
 The available accounts and documents suggest that the first meeting was 
probably in August 1941. It was then that Donovan told Wolff that the British 
wanted to parachute guerrilla fighters behind enemy lines in Yugoslavia, Austria, 
Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland to promote guerrilla movements.48 For this 
reason they requested to be allowed to recruit US veterans of the International 
Brigades to work alongside the British secret services, particularly if they had 
southern or eastern European origins and/or linguistic abilities.49 The first British 
plans to send help to the guerrillas in countries such as Yugoslavia materialized 
in August 1941, the same month that several US veterans of the International 
Brigades remember being informed of this first meeting.50  
                                                          
46 Peter N. Carroll, Michael Nash and Melvin Small (eds.), The Good Fight Continues: World War Two 
Letters from the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (New York: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 5-6. 
47 John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, In Denial: Historians, Communism & Espionage (San Francisco:  
Encounter Books, 2003), pp. 127-130. 
48 Interview with Milton Wolff in Terkel, Oral History, pp. 479-480 
49 Carroll, Odyssey, p. 244. 
50 Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, The Resistance, and the Rivalries 
that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p. 83; Carroll, Nash and Small, Good 
Fight, p. 6. 
 Wolff told Donovan that he would need to make enquiries first. After 
obtaining permission from the Comintern, Wolff started a nationwide 
recruitment drive among International Brigades veterans.51 Around September or 
October 1941, although the veteran Milton Felsen mentions November, several 
veterans recruited by Wolff met Donovan in New York. “I've been approached by 
British intelligence” –started Donovan. “They want certain of our guys to 
volunteer for their Special Forces units. It will be dangerous underground work. I 
don't have to bullshit you; things, as you know, are going very badly in the war. 
It's up to you, but it's a chance to get one more crack at Hitler.”52 Following the 
meeting Goff was recruited by the SOE on October 19th 1941 with the intention of 
sending him to Gibraltar to work undercover in Spain.53 
 However, everything changed on December 7th 1941. The Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbour resulted in the United States entering the war and Donovan’s 
agency decided to create their own special operations units. Shortly before the 
veterans had been due to depart for Britain, Donovan organized another meeting 
in Washington. "Listen”, said the colonel, “I know who you guys are. Left-
wingers, radicals, maybe even Communists, but I don't give a damn. I want you in 
this outfit, not in England. You're Americans, not limeys. We're in the war and 
you belong here."54 From that moment, a group of veterans comprising the 
                                                          
51 Carroll, Odyssey, pp. 244-245; Interview with Milton Wolff in Terkel, Oral History, pp. 479-480 
52 Felsen, Anti-Warrior, p. 151 
53 Irving Goff. From 29 Oct. 1941 to 14 Nov. 1941, London, The National Archives (TNA). Special 
Operations Executive: Personnel Files Series HS9/594/4 
54 Felsen, Anti-Warrior, p. 152 
former guerrilla fighters Aalto and Goff, along with Vincent Lossowsky, Milton 
Felsen, Alfred Tanz and Michael A. Jimenez were incorporated into the COI/OSS.   
 The veterans insisted on the necessity of organizing a group to carry out 
paramilitary and intelligence operations in Spain. Wolff suggested the Allies 
should attack Francoist Spain in winter 1941, believing that guerrilla warfare 
would find support among the population and that the guerrilla nuclei active 
since the end of the war would act as a base for the operation.55 However, the 
ambiguous position of Franco, who declared himself to be non-belligerent while 
collaborating with the Axis powers, made the British and US governments wary, 
particularly their diplomats in Madrid. It was thus decided that there would be 
no intervention in Spain for the moment, although they began to draw up plans 
in case they were needed.56 
  In order to organize intelligence and sabotage units, Donovan needed to 
set up schools for training in guerrilla warfare. In August 1941 he had already 
requested help from the British to create a school, but not on US soil so as not to 
compromise their neutrality. Just two days after the attack on Pearl Harbour the 
British opened Camp X in Canada. During a period of more than two years 
around 500 British, US and Canadian students passed through the school.57 
However, the Japanese attack had altered the situation. Donovan now wanted a 
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new training school on US soil to instruct his people in guerrilla warfare as soon 
as possible.  
On that same December 7th 1941 Donovan presented Roosevelt with an 
extensive report recommending the creation of guerrilla units similar to British 
commandos and for which a special training school was required. Following 
Churchill’s visit to Roosevelt at Christmas 1941, the president approved the 
budget for the project. On February 25th 1942 the COI received full authorization 
“to organize and conduct secret subversive operations in hostile areas”. The 
Secretary of War agreed that Donovan be provided with 200 men to serve as 
instructors in the school a month later.58 Meanwhile, Donovan requested help 
from his British colleagues owing to the US military’s lack of knowledge of 
irregular warfare. The British provided advice and instructors such as Major 
Brooker, Lieutenant Colonel Skilbeck, and Major Dehn. However, they had little 
or no personal experience of guerrilla warfare.59  
Under these circumstances veterans of the International Brigades, 
particularly those with experience of guerrilla warfare, became vital to the OSS. 
After the meeting Donovan took them up a mountain by limousine. From here 
they could see the site where the school was to be created. "This was a rich kids' 
camp," said Donovan to them. "We plan to make it into the main training area, 
and I want all your ideas, everything you learned about guerrilla war and 
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underground operations in Spain."60 On April 1st 1942 instructors, officers and 
men recruited by Donovan, among whom were former members of the 
International Brigades, started arriving at Catoctin Recreational Demonstration 
Area, a national park of 9.000 acres on the outskirts of Washington. This remote 
site, named Area B, became the first and largest guerrilla warfare training school 
on US soil.61   
Nevertheless, the creation of the school was not without problems. The 
first groups of students arrived in May 1942 when nothing had yet been planned. 
Felsen admitted that “in the early spring of 1942, COI-OSS training was bizarre. 
From Donovan himself down, notions of who we were, what we were, and what 
we were supposed to be doing were at best foggy and at worst erroneous.”62 The 
most worrisome aspect was British and American instructors´ lack of knowledge 
about guerrilla warfare. According to one of the early students in Area B: 
“Lectures on guerrilla warfare” were taught “by senior officers who had never seen 
this type of operation, or combat either for that matter. They taught it by the 
book, apparently an old Army manual”.63 Bob Farley, another International 
Brigades veteran who was a student in Area B, had to correct the instructors, 
pointing out their errors on several occasions.64 In this context, International 
Brigade veterans played a crucial role in  advising officers and instructors on 
irregular war. “Our opinions and experience seemed to be highly valued” –
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remembered Felsen.65 In that sense, in addition to transferring their knowledge 
as instructors, Aalto and Goff also recommended the translation of manuals on 
guerrilla warfare that they had studied in Spain, such as On Guerrilla Warfare by 
Mao Tse-Tung or the Soviet Russian Guerrilla Manual.66 Both were translated 
from Russian to English thanks to a curious collaboration between two other 
transnational soldiers: the former Soviet General Alexander Barmine, who had 
fled the Soviet Union in 1933, and the Russian Prince Serge Obolensky, who was 
also a refugee in the US having belonged to the White Army. “There was nothing 
else in those days and we had to create it”- admitted Felsen.67  
The school improved over the following months with the development of 
an ambitious syllabus involving intelligence and guerrilla warfare. The students 
learned to handle weapons from different European countries; how to use 
different types of explosives (dynamite, Molotov cocktails, etc.) to blow up train 
tracks, bridges and buildings; parachute rigging and jumping; close-combat 
techniques; radio communication, etc.68 The veterans combined the roles of 
advisors and students in this second stage as they were learning techniques they 
had not come across in Spain, such as parachuting.69 The school set up new 
training camps named Areas A, C, D and F, which specialized in different 
subjects.  
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The school was notable for being transnational from its inception. On 
March 25th 1942 the Secretary of War decreed that “aliens and foreign nationals” 
could become officers in the US Army after passing through Area B where they 
were trained to lead “ethnic” raider units.70 Consequently, the school provided 
training for agents of different nationalities who were then sent behind enemy 
lines in Europe: US, British, Thai, Norwegians, French, Russians, Yugoslavs, 
Spanish, Italians, Greeks, etc. In December 1942 these groups were renamed as 
Operational Groups (OGs).71 This great diversity can be seen in the documentary 
film “OSS Training Group”, produced by John Ford at Area B in 1942. “In this 
group there are some who speak very little English. One of them has fought in 
four wars. Two of them are veteran guerrillas of the Spanish Loyalist Forces.” –
said the narrator as masked recruits appeared on screen.72 
 The two “veteran guerrillas” were Aalto and Goff, who, in September 1942, 
after months advising and instructing, created a group comprising two more 
veterans of the International Brigades (Felsen and Lossowski) and four Spanish 
ex-combatants.  At the beginning of 1942 Donovan had tasked Donald Downes, a 
professor of literature who had started working for the COI in 1941, to recruit 
Spanish refugees in Latin America. Through the networks of exiles he managed to 
recruit Ricardo Sicre – previously an instructor at the Osterley Home Guard 
Training School in London directed by the British veteran of the International 
Brigades Tom Wintringham-, Progreso Barrios, Francisco Tuesta and Miguel 
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Chamorro.73 “The teaching is good and we have learned a lot in spite of our ample 
experience.” –wrote Sicre to a representative of the Spanish Government in exile 
about his time at Area B.74 
Spanish and International Brigade veterans were highly valuable to the 
OSS because of their first-hand knowledge of the tactics of guerrilla warfare, but 
also because of their knowledge of Spain. Indeed, after the veteran had made 
their contribution in the school as instructors, Donovan began to plan his first 
missions in the field. In September 1942 the unit was assigned to the Spanish 
Desk under the supervision of Downes.75  Around this time Aalto put forward a 
precise plan for clandestine infiltration in Spain. However, this and other similar 
plans concerning Operation Torch were provisionally rejected.76  The US and 
Britain, fearing that, after the liberation of North Africa, Hitler would invade 
Spain to take Gibraltar and Spanish Morocco needed to be prepared for this 
contingency. This required them to be prudent so as not to alter the precarious 
balance of Franco’s policy of non-belligerence.77  
While the group was awaiting its definitive orders Aalto was expelled. 
Years later, Felsen admitted that Aalto had been reported by his own comrades 
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from the International Brigades and the CPUSAE. Following a night when Aalto 
had openly shown his homosexuality by going to a hotel with a US sailor his 
companions went to Donovan’s office to report him. According to Felsen, 
Donovan “seemed genuinely sorry to hear about Aalto, whom he liked and 
admired, but he assured us we had by all means done the right thing.”78 The 
homophobia of his comrades and the US Army thus prevented perhaps the 
biggest US expert on guerrilla warfare from taking part in any mission with the 
OSS during WWII.79 
After the expulsion of Aalto, the group received three new members: Mike 
Jiménez, a former member of the International Brigades who was in charge of 
guerrilla communications in Spain, his brother James,80 and Captain Jerry Sage, 
an ex-football star, who became the military leader of the group supervised by 
Downes.81 The unit was finally given a mission: to go to North Africa “to establish 
an OSS unit as an integral part of the G2 of an army in the field”.82 They set sail 
for Algeria from New York at Christmas 1942.83 Although eight of the eleven 
members had combat experience from the Spanish Civil War, the expedition was 
led by Downes and Sage, who lacked military experience but showed no signs of 
being left-leaning politically. The OSS was open-minded when it came to 
recruiting old left-wingers or even communists who could offer significant 
military experience and knowledge but tended to give them a low profile so as 
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not to arouse suspicion in the War Department, who were not in favour of their 
recruitment.84 
 
“What I had in mind: blowin’ up railroads”: Transnational Soldiers in 
North Africa and Italy (1942-1944) 
 The group reached Algeria in January 1943 with the aim of setting up a 
guerrilla school to train Spanish refugees who were to be recruited throughout 
North Africa. On arrival they contacted the omnipotent conservative diplomat 
Robert Murphy, the man who had negotiated with François Darlan, commander 
of the French forces loyal to Vichy in North Africa, in November 1942.85 As a 
result of these negotiations the majority of the Vichy regime’s prisoners were still 
in concentration camps and forced work battalions in the desert. Anthony Eden, 
the British Foreign Secretary, reported that in November 1942 Allied troops had 
found 7,100 political prisoners in North Africa: 3,200 Spanish, 900 French and 
3.000 of other nationalities. Robert Murphy spoke of 9,000 in December 1942.86  
The Spanish prisoners in the concentration camps were Republican ex-
combatants who had fled to North Africa at the end of the Spanish Civil War. 
Amongst them were dozens of guerrillas from the 14th Corps of the Republican 
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Army who had managed to escape to Algeria in 1939.87 Downes’ group visited one 
of the camps in January 1943, discovering the terrible conditions under which the 
prisoners lived. The unit were shocked that this type of concentration camps 
could exist in an area under Allied command. Despite extremely poor health, 
many Spanish expressed their desire to join the Allied army and continue the 
fight against fascism.88 During the first visit they were able to recruit sixteen 
Spanish ex-combatants to join the unit.89 
 However, this mission was temporarily interrupted by an incident in 
Madrid, where an OSS agent had been arrested, causing Franco to react angrily.90 
The British and US ambassadors, together with Murphy, tried to calm him and 
convince him that there would be no further Allied intelligence activity in Spain. 
This led to an argument between Donovan and Murphy in which the latter 
demanded that the former remove “those left-wing lunatics” from Algeria. 
According to Felsen, this was why Murphy ordered them to fight against 
Rommel’s Afrika Corps at the battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.91 The group 
protested, arguing that it was inappropriate to send a highly-trained guerrilla 
group to fight on open ground in what was, furthermore, an insignificant battle. 
The order was not revoked and an officer even threatened Goff with court-martial 
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if he disobeyed.92 After almost a month of fighting in Tunisia, the group had lost 
Captain Sage and Felsen, both captured by the Germans, while several of the 
recently-liberated Spanish were wounded.93  
 Donovan travelled to Algeria to clarify the situation of his special group 
with Murphy as soon as he heard the news. The group soon recovered their 
autonomy and returned to the original plan: to organize a guerrilla school and 
train Spanish ex-combatants.94 During the first months of 1943 the British and US 
military agencies recruited hundreds of foreigners in North Africa. The Spanish 
community was the largest in Algeria, and, having significant military experience, 
was in great demand. Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that there was 
political bias in the recruitment by each intelligence service. The SOE preferred 
to recruit Spanish anarchists while the OSS mainly recruited communists.95 The 
British had always been against the presence of communists in their intelligence 
and sabotage units. On the other hand, the ever-pragmatic Donovan always 
valued experience over ideology.96 
 Most of Downes’ group were members of the CPUSA and the PCE and it 
was thus natural that they relied on the networks they trusted. The unit had 
managed to make contact with the clandestine PCE in North Africa in February 
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1943 through networks of exiles in Mexico and the US.97 The recruitment system 
was based on a simple method whereby the PCE first drew up a list of the 
comrades they deemed most suitable for service in an OSS unit. Next, Downes’ 
group searched for them in the concentration camps and secured their release.98 
Using this method, sixty men from at least eight camps in French Morocco and 
Algeria were recruited in the first two months. They were then organized into 
groups of radio telegraph operators, guerrilla fighters and the intelligence 
service.99 However, this collaboration was based on mutual mistrust. The Spanish 
communists were wary of the OSS despite having comrades in their ranks while 
the OSS distrusted the communists. Nevertheless, both felt they had something 
to gain from this collaboration at the start of 1943.100   
 Downes’ group were assigned to Massingham, a joint project of the SOE 
and OSS in Algiers, which opened in February 1943 and became the main 
command hub and training centre for special operations into southwestern 
Europe. The Spanish combatants recruited in the concentration camps were the 
first students and they “reflected the diversity of the world coalition against 
fascism”.101 In Massingham special agents of many nationalities were trained, but, 
as T.C. Wales emphasized, this pluralism was far from idyllic, leading to discord 
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and cultural misunderstandings. Major Peter Murray Lee, the British officer sent 
to Massingham to take charge of security at the school, was horrified to see “tiny 
hens (…) Spanish communist (…) –none of them were more than five feet tall”-, 
who “saluted with a closed fist”.102  
 As a result, Downes applied to set up his own schools to train the Spanish 
combatants. Downes’ group had the necessary training. Thus, in March 1943, 
Mike Jiménez and his brother opened a communications school in Bainen 
Falaise, on the outskirts of Algiers. Thanks to the accounts of some of the 
students it is known that they studied radio reception and transmission, 
cryptography, security, intelligence, clandestine work, weapons handling and 
landings.103  According to Downes, the quality of the school directed by the 
International Brigades veterans was higher than that of Massingham and 
consequently “other OSS desks were begging us to take their students”.104 
Downes' assertion may simply have been an exaggeration motivated by the 
context of strong competition that existed between the American and British 
military in North Africa at that time.105 The SOE syllabus in communications of 
September 1943, produced just six months after the opening of Downes’ School, 
displays a high level of knowledge in the subject.106 However, it is also possible 
that Downes was not exaggerating, since in September 1943 the veteran Mike 
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Jimenez was transferred to Italy and appointed as the new chief of 
Communications of the Fifth Army.107 
The group also organized in parallel a school of guerrilla warfare in El Biar, 
in the suburbs of Algiers.108 However, this location was deemed unsuitable and 
they asked Downes to move it. The G2 of the Fifth Army helped them to 
camouflage the new school, now situated 70 km from Oujda, a town close to the 
border with Spanish Morocco.109 The school, officially named “Fifth Army 
Meteorological Station”, opened in May 1943.   
The school had 12 instructors and taught cohorts of 50 students.110 All were 
Spanish veterans with some, such as José Aranda, Joaquín Centurión and 
Francisco Bueno, having experience in guerrilla units. The duration of the courses 
depended on the knowledge and experience of the students. The school at Oujda 
taught topography, exploration, modern weaponry, military tactics, sabotage, 
demolition and explosives. In addition to the theory classes there were also 
practical sessions in the mountains around the school.111 There was even a replica 
of the “house of horrors” from Area B in the US. This, in turn, was a replica of that 
of Camp X in Canada, which had been copied from a British model. It consisted 
of a special room for shooting practice involving targets appearing unexpectedly 
and mirrors.112 
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 Although Downes’ group had been training Spanish ex-combatants since 
February 1943 these could not be given a mission as there was an order not to 
carry out clandestine operations in Spain. However, this changed in May 1943 
when the Fifth Army wished to deploy intelligence services in Spanish Morocco 
to obtain information on German schools of sabotage, movement of German 
personnel, locations of military installations and airports, etc. From May 
onwards, the group made forays into Spanish territory on the orders of Colonel 
William Eddy, an OSS officer in Algeria.113 These special services discovered a 
Hispano-German spy network between Oran and Melilla, a German sabotage 
school in Melilla and a demolition school directed by the German Karl Frick in 
mainland Spain. Downes suggested sabotaging the Melilla school and 
assassinating Frick but General Mark W. Clark would not allow this type of action 
in Spanish territory.114 
 However, in June 1943, due to the success of these services, the G2 of the 
Fifth Army took the decision to authorize Downes’ activities on the Spanish 
mainland.115 They designed a plan of infiltration, named Operation Banana, with 
the intention of establishing a network of intelligence and radio operators along 
the Mediterranean coast of Spain (Málaga, Cartagena, Cádiz, Algeciras, 
Barcelona) and Madrid. The operation was named Banana after the code name 
for Málaga, the city to which the first unit would be sent.116 When Downes 
relayed the news to the Spanish and International Brigades veterans in Oujda 
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there was an explosion of joy. They had been waiting four years for the 
opportunity to again fight fascism in Spain.117 
 The team made two landings on the Málaga coast between June and 
September 1943.  Each of these permitted the infiltration of three Spanish 
combatants trained at the schools in Algiers and Oujda: a pilot, a radio-telegraph 
operator and an intelligence agent. All six were members of the PCE and carried 
two machine guns, revolvers, two radio transmitters and a small sum of money. 
They also managed to infiltrate some agents through the border with Morocco 
and thence to the mainland. Communication between Málaga and Algeria started 
in July. Reports by radio were received in an office at the school in Oujda where 
they were translated from Spanish into English and sent to the G2. The 
information involved military positions, weapons and recruits in the Francoist 
army but was scarce and vague. The PCE had given other codes to the radio 
operators so they could send unofficial reports to the party, bypassing the OSS. 
The six agents encountered enormous difficulties as the PCE network in Málaga 
was virtually non-existent and they did not have the resources required to survive 
in secrecy.118  
 For the first landing Downes’ group received help from Colonel William 
Eddy and Colonel Arthur Roseborough, who primed the British and US naval 
authorities. In fact, the first group was taken out to sea by the Prodigal, a boat 
belonging to the SIS.119 In contrast, the second group had to confront the 
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authorities. Operation Banana had come to the attention of the British 
intelligence services, who reported it to the Foreign Office.120 The British and US 
ambassadors in Spain, Samuel Hoare and Carlton Hayes, along with Robert 
Murphy were three enemies of clandestine operations in Spain. They demanded 
that the operation be cancelled. According to Downes, the British Foreign Office 
ordered that “no British vessels are to take any further clandestine landings to 
Spain”.121  Consequently, the group decided to act autonomously and create their 
own “naval army” to carry out the operation. As there were a large number of 
Spanish Republican sailors in North Africa the group bought a boat and repaired 
it with their help. The first two attempts to embark were detected and stopped by 
British security, but, on September 23rd, they were able to escape detection and 
transport the Spanish agents to Spanish territory.122  
 This change of policy responded to the new scenario of the war in 
southern Europe, the centre of Allied operations since the liberation of North 
Africa. The fear of the German invasion of Spain had disappeared and Italy was 
now the priority. The invasions of Sicily and Corsica were planned in North Africa 
and the Allied central office needed the best special operations unit: Downes’ 
group. Goff, “one of the world’s most accomplished and renowned guerrillas”,123 
and Lossowski were ordered to recruit 75 Italian and American agents for the 
operation.124 They eventually organized a group of 90 men, which included 
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several of the Spanish recruits who had trained in the US and Algeria. The unit 
was sent to Sicily, from where it took part in the landing at Salerno on September 
9th 1943.125  
Downes’ group established the OSS Fifth Army Headquarters in Amalfi in 
immediately. Donovan appointed Downes as head of the OSS in Italy until he was 
replaced by Colonel Ellery C. Huntington Jr. in October 1943, while Goff and 
Lossowski’s group were assigned to intelligence fieldwork. Donovan himself 
joined the group a few days before the invasion of Naples.126 After the landing on 
the Italian mainland, Goff and Lossowski were assigned to the 3rd and 34th 
Divisions respectively in order to recruit, organise, equip and train the first six 
Operational Groups in Italy.127 In the next two months, Goff and Lossowski “were 
almost continuously with ‘combat teams’ at front doing the work which proved to 
be our real ‘entry ticket’ to the Fifth Army show.” 128 After these operations, Goff 
and Lossowski’s group moved to the North and made contact with the PCI, 
advising them on guerrilla and sabotage operations. During the war in Italy, this 
group of transnational soldiers trained between 18 and 22 teams of radio 
operators and specialists in crossing enemy lines while also co-ordinating the 
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activities of the Italian partisans.129 Donovan asked Goff directly about his 
connections with the Italian communists:  
“I told him what the connections were all about and what I had in mind: 
blowin’ up railroads (…) He says: ‘But in your connection, make sure the 
Communist Party doesn`t come out ahead’. I said, ‘That’s valid. They’re 
out to win the war, we’re out to win the war. I’ll do the best I can to win 
this war’. He said fine, and left.”130 
Meanwhile, in North Africa, the Spanish communists made the most of 
the training, infrastructure and weapons provided by the OSS and continued with 
the plans for Operation Banana independently. In November 1943 they managed 
to secretly send a new expedition with 5 machine guns and two radio transmitter-
receivers. However, in February 1944 the Francoist police arrested all the agents 
who had arrived since July.131 The PCE also created its own guerrilla training 
school in North Africa using the combatants trained by the Americans as 
instructors. Their aim was to infiltrate ten guerrilla fighters in Spain every two 
months from North Africa. However, between 1944 and 1946 they were only able 
to organize three landings of ten men each time.132 Infiltration through the 
Pyrenees was much more significant over the next few years, although the lack of 
                                                          
129 Interview with Irving Goff and Vincent Lossowski in Terkel, Good War, pp. 214, 493-494, 496; Franco 
Giannantoni, L’ombra degli americani sulla Resistenza al confine tra Italia e Svizzera (Esizioni Essezeta-
Arterigere, 2007), pp. 265-266; Peter Tompkins, L’altra Resistenza. Servizi segreti, partigiani e Guerra de 
liberazione nel racconto di un protagonista (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 2009), pp. 49, 111-112. 
130 Irterview with Irving Goff in Terkel, Good War, p. 494 
131 Military Trial. 11 Feb. 1944 to 16 Jan. 1945, AGHD. 
132 Jorge Marco, Guerrilleros and Neighbours in Arms: Identities and Cultures of Anti-fascist Resistance 
in Spain (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2016), pp. 51-53. 
Allied support prevented the Spanish resistance from achieving the same success 
as partisan movements in the rest of Europe.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has demonstrated how military institutions such as the OSS 
incorporated tactical innovations in guerrilla warfare using the intermediary role 
of veterans in the Spanish War between the experience of the Russian Civil War 
and World War II. Guerrilla warfare, as a combined tactic with the operations of 
a regular army, played a key role in the Second World War. However, knowledge 
of this type of irregular warfare among the Allied military before 1939 was very 
limited. The most experienced army in this kind of warfare was the Red Army, 
based on its experiences during the Russian Civil War. In this context, the 
Spanish Civil War was a crucial event in transferring knowledge of guerrilla 
warfare from the East to the West through transnational soldiers, advisers and 
instructors.  
The Spanish Civil War was a laboratory for military strategies. The 
formation of elite guerrilla units integrated into the Republican Army was one of 
the major novelties. To a large extent, this took place as a result of the 
contribution made by Soviet advisors and instructors, who had been arriving 
since 1936 to help construct the new Popular Army. With their experience in the 
Russian and Chinese Civil Wars they were able to train thousands of Spanish and 
international guerrilla fighters. At the end of the Spanish Civil War thousands of 
these soldiers either returned to their own countries or emigrated to another, 
where they subsequently contributed to the war effort during WWII, imparting 
their knowledge of guerrilla warfare. 
This article has shown the important role of these transnational soldiers in 
the transfer of this military strategy. Although many international and Spanish 
volunteers with experience in the Spanish Civil War helped with the spread of 
guerrilla warfare in WWII, the contribution of the two North Americans Bill 
Aalto and Irving Goff was undoubtedly the most significant due to their 
participation in the formation and development of the OSS. Aalto and Goff were 
the two key figures in the creation of guerrilla schools, translation of the manuals 
and organization of the Operational Groups in the US, North Africa and Italy 
which crossed enemy lines throughout Europe. This article also shows that 
having experience was not sufficient for the transmission of this knowledge. This 
process required the support of international networks, recruitment processes 
and training schools provided by state institutions such as the Spanish 
Republican Army or the OSS.  
It is here that William Donovan’s exceptional vision was of fundamental 
importance. In contrast to the British secret services, the director of the OSS 
never allowed ideological prejudices to interfere with an individual’s potential 
contribution. He knew perfectly well that the experience of those former 
International Brigaders in Spain had a great value for training in guerrilla warfare 
and sabotage. Thanks to his conviction, they were able to bring their knowledge 
and experiences from the Spanish Civil War to the Second World War via three 
continents: from Spain to the United States, from the United States to North 
Africa, and from North Africa to Europe via different armies, schools and 
battlefields.  
 
